He wanted to settle the matter because of its bearing on a related constitutional issue, the extent of Congress's authority, under Article III, to make "exceptions" to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdictionan authority conventionally characterized, ever since Ex parte Mc. Cardle, 4 as without limit. For if Beard's (and Marshall's) understanding was correct-namely, that the Framers expected the federal judiciary to act as a check on the unconstitutional behavior of the elective branches-what sense would it make to authorize Congress to frustrate the mechanism by curtailing, or perhaps abolishing entirely, the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction? The nagging sense that such a reading of the "exceptions" clause would make the Constitution a potentially self-defeating document is only underscored (as Berger fully appreciated) by the settled understanding that Congress is not obliged to create any inferior federal courts 5 and by the very limited nature of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Putting these ingredients together, it would appear that Congress could, in theory, liquidate all federal courts other than the Supreme Court and reduce that Court to inconsequentiality by abolishing its power to review state courts." Yet this, as Hart argued in his superb "Dialectic" in 1953, would appear to be an inadmissible conclusion. 7 For Berger, the dilemma was such as to force him to reexamine the dilemma's premisethe validity of judicial review. This is the starting point for the book Berger has written-and which, very properly, he dedicated to Hart.
Berger For our era, Jabberwock can now be counted as really dead. No one, it would seem, will feel called upon to save judicial review again.
If the more than two hundred and fifty pages vindicating Marshall and Story are a species of historical over-kill, they are balanced (if that be the correct word) by the dozen pages spent on the "exceptions" clause: Berger shows that, in the ratification debates, there was extensive discussion of the "exceptions" clause, but all of it was addressed to the concerns of those who feared that the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its appellate authority "both as to Law and Fact," would be free to overturn jury determinations. The "exceptions" clause was relied on by proponents of the Constitution to show that Congress could preclude such appellate interference with the trial process (the reassurance seems only to have been partially effective, wherefore the Seventh Amendment). From this Berger infers that the Framers did not regard the "exceptions" clause as a method of confining, let alone altogether undercutting, the Supreme Court's power of judicial review. Thus we are led to Berger's principal conclusion:
Once the legitimacy of judicial review and its central role in the Constitutional scheme are granted, the power of Congress to make "exceptions" to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction cannot properly be given unlimited scope. There is no indication whatever that the Founders conceived the "exceptions" clause as a check on the Court's Constitutional decisions. It seems hardly reasonable to conclude that they designed an effective curb on Congressional excesses and simultaneously furnished Congress with an easy means of circumventing it. To attribute that dual intention to the Founders is to charge them with chasing their tails around a stump. So far as can be gathered from the intensive discussions of the "exceptions" clause in the Ratification conventions, its purpose was narrow and altogether unrelated to a power to deprive the Court of jurisdiction of Constitutional claims. And as is the case with other powers, the "exceptions" power cannot override the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, which without judicial enforcement are mere "parchment" barriers. 10 With all respect, the assertion that the "exceptions" clause "cannot properly be given unlimited scope" does not bring analysis of the ultimate problems beyond where Henry Hart took it in 1953. Thus (to take one crucially important example) we can be reasonably confident that the "exceptions" clause and the power to disestablish inferior federal courts cannot, even in combination, obliterate the right of one in federal custody to present his claims, via habeas corpus or an equivalent writ, to some federal judge: this is so because, through explicit reference to habeas corpus, the Constitution has established Madison itself stands for the proposition that, absent a (constitutional) legislatively created remedy, official illegality is, from a court's perspective, damnum absque injuria.1 2 And even the Congress which drafted the First Judiciary Act-the Congress led by Ellsworth and Madison and others of the Framers-conferred on the new lower federal courts, and on the new Supreme Court (in its appellate authority over federal and state courts), only a portion of the judisdiction contemplated by Article III. It is, in short, a familiar fact that for substantial periods of our national experience there have been constitutional questions of great moment which-although they presented themselves in an appropriate "case" or "controversy"-could not reach the Supreme Court. If we add this history to the history so patiently explored by Berger, the full complexity of the issues begins to emerge.
It 13 The problem would of course become more difficult if Congress withdrew from the Supreme Court appellate cognizance of all state cases in which a state law was challenged on federal constitutional grounds, whether the state courts sustained or invalidated the disputed provisions of state law. One may grant that such an arrangement-with its open invitation to disuniformity in the enforcement of federal guarantees-would be wildly imprudent (and especially so if the lower federal courts were also to have their jurisdiction over such cases withdrawn). But is it clear that such a narrowing of the Supreme Court's appellate authority would be unconstitutional? 14 The question which chiefly concerns Berger would become most acute if Congress were to attempt drastically to curtail the opportunities of state and federal courts, including the Supreme Court, to review federal legislation. In such an event-as would not be the case in the instances involving state legislation-Congress would seem to be undertaking to frustrate the very mechanism by which it was intended to be policed. 15 One can, of course, postulate federal laws, passed pursuant to the "exceptions" clause, purporting to withdraw from Supreme Court review vast domains of litigation challenging state and federal action-all church-state cases, for example, or all reapportionment cases. But laws of such breadth are likely to provoke the coalescing opposition of many interest groups, and hence are extremely difficult of enactment. A far more likely legislative effort is that which seeks to "overrule" a particular disfavored decision. For example, it was the express intention of the Senate Judiciary Committee, in the version of Title II of the Omni- ruling that a confession is "voluntary" and hence admissible where "such ruling is supported by any competent evidence admitted at the trial" or (b) a comparable ruling of a state trial court "affirmed or otherwise upheld by the highest court of the State having appellate jurisdiction of the cause." Whether viewed as limitations on the appellate authority of the Supreme Court (or lower federal courts) or as limitations on the authority of a federal court sitting in habeas corpus, these provisions would have been unconstitutional-not so much because they were attempted withdrawals of jurisdiction to hear constitutional cases as because they were attempted invasions by the legislature of the judicial province. So long as a federal court is not ousted of its authority to hear a case or class of cases, it may-indeed it constitutionally must-resist legislative instruction with respect to the mode and scope of its adjudication of the constitutional issues which the case presents. Justice Rutledge put the matter succinctly a quarter of a century ago:
It is one thing for Congress to withhold jurisdiction. It is entirely another to confer it and direct that it be exercised in a manner inconsistent with constitutional requirements or, what in some instances may be the same thing, without regard to them.... There are limits to the judicial power. Congress may impose others. And in some matters Congress or the President has the final say under the Constitution. But whenever the judicial power is called into play, it is responsible directly to the fundamental law and no other authority can intervene to force or authorize the judicial body to disregard it. 17 What Rutledge postulated was soon reduced by Hart to a phrase-.. jurisdiction always is jurisdiction only to decide constitutionally."'" And to this must be added Hart's statement of the measure of the "exceptions" clause: "The measure is simply that the exceptions must not be such as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan."' 0 Of this latter axiom Berger's book is a valuable annotation.
